Trust and regret – guardians of our decisions. What can go wrong?

Vaccination has been in the news again. Amongst others, science writer Virginia Hughes has given thoughtful comments on why ordinary people mistrust scientists on this issue.

I take this as a lesson in how science communication and public engagement can go wrong. As a scientist I feel hurt not to be trusted. As a mother I can imagine what it’s like when you are told you should vaccinate your child. I have been there and I have learned from the episode when the use of the triple MMR vaccine was blamed for the increase in autism, when Andrew Wakefield was celebrated as a hero speaking out for parents. The pharma industry, government and scientists were all accused of bias. What basic cognitive processes are involved in the way we make the decision to vaccinate or not to vaccinate? How can these processes undermine scientifically based advice?science-megaphone-300x226 Continue reading Trust and regret – guardians of our decisions. What can go wrong?

Why doesn’t rational explanation as provided by scientific evidence speak for itself? Here’s where our social minds play tricks with us. We basically prefer the inaccurate message given out by a trusted person over the accurate message given by a possibly untrustworthy person. But perhaps these are not tricks. Although it pains me to say this, trust can be more important than scientific truth. Here’s why. Evolution has endowed social creatures, including human beings, with the predisposition to cooperate. And for cooperation to work we need to trust each other. Many animals show reciprocal altruism: ‘I scratch your back and you scratch mine’, and human beings go one step further by showing indirect altruism: ‘I scratch your back, and one of your kin will scratch the back of one of mine. Thus, people help each other without the explicit idea to get something in return, but perhaps with the implicit belief that someone else will give help at another time. Because this belief is unspoken, and because helpers are often anonymous, free riding becomes very tempting. And as we know, if there are too many free riders, trust and cooperation will collapse.

Evolutionary theorists suggest that cycles of cooperation and trust alternate with lack of cooperation and distrust. To reinstate trust both forgiveness and punishment are needed. For instance, if people are prepared to punish free riders, then this eventually reinstates trust in the group. This is called altruistic punishment because it actually costs the person who does the punishment. At the very least, he attracts the dislike of the person he punishes.

Trust weighs heavily in the decision to vaccinate or not. We remember vividly the old family doctor who once mentioned that vaccination was not a good thing. But why is our memory so good for messages that tell us not to vaccinate?

When our social mind makes a choice then trust and the person making a recommendation, are not the only factors. The big players are our emotions. Our brain is particularly responsive to any kind of threat. But even more important may be an emotion known as anticipated regret.

Imagine you are bidding in an auction, and you do not get the item you bid for. You will show disappointment. Now imagine you are told that your bid was only very slightly less than that of the successful buyer. You will show regret. You regret that you did not offer a slightly higher bid. It has been shown that in auctions where the final price is revealed, buyers offer higher bids, than when it is not. This is a sign of anticipated regret. We feel this emotion automatically as a result of internal computations, of which we are not aware. Now it has also been shown that you are more likely to feel regret when you commit an act and something bad happens. You won’t feel so regretful when you omitted to do something. This is the case when you decide not to vaccinate. You didn’t commit something that might turn out to be wrong. You just omitted something.

The MMR story is a story of lack of trust, and a story of the wrong kind of anticipated regret. It is wrong because it disregards the consequences of not vaccinating. Several factors contributed to the lack of trust. To begin with, there may be a predisposition to distrust scientists who are often portrayed as callous and more interested in abstract generalisations rather than the fate of individual people. The decision to vaccinate means you are allowing a temporary hurt to your child, while your overarching inclination is to protect your child from hurt. Why should you allow this hurt, when you have no personal memory of the severity of illnesses such as mumps, measles and rubella. Protecting your child from these almost mythical illnesses seems somehow less pressing than protecting your child from an immediate danger. So, when Dr. Andrew Wakefield, came forward as taking a stand against vaccination, his opinion fell on fertile ground. Further, the possibility that the package of a triple vaccination – a triple injury – might cause a brain disorder, such as autism, seemed plausible.

As so often correlation turned into causation: autism had increased recently; the triple vaccination was introduced recently; ergo, the triple vaccination caused the increase. In the UK the Medical Research Council immediately set up projects designed to answer the question whether indeed there was a causal connection. The answer was no, and the scientific advice was that the triple vaccination is safe.

In spite of this advice, nobody believed it. This was strange and needs further explanation. Why was the trust in Wakefield continuing, when there was at the same time a lack of trust in scientific advice? Here is where the concept of anticipated regret comes in. Parents were ‘playing safe’, or so they thought, by not giving their children a single triple short vaccine. In fact, playing safe was an act of omission, and this is less linked to regret than commission. However, if you choose not to vaccinate your child, then you are a free rider, because the protection remains as long as everyone else (or the vast majority) does vaccinate their child. In order to be effective 90% of the population has to be vaccinated. Many middle class people thought they were justified in becoming free riders for the sake of their child. In consequence there have been outbreaks of measles.

Here is the gist of an interview that illustrates the role of anticipated regret in the MMR story. Interviewer: “Would you let your child get the controversial MMR vaccine?” Father: “Certainly not. If I let my child get the MMR vaccine and he later becomes autistic, I will never forgive myself.” Interviewer: “What, if your child then contracted the measles and died?” Father: “This would be an act of God. I would be very sad, but not feel guilty.”

We all know the end of the story. Remarkably, the reason that MMR vaccination became acceptable again for parents had nothing to do with the restoration of trust in scientists. Quite the opposite. It became known that Andrew Wakefield had a commercial stake in the development of single vaccines. Now, people who previously believed him to be a brave hero who spoke against powerful lobbies, such as big pharma, lost their trust in him. Another reason in favour of vaccination is the increase in measles, mumps and rubella outbreaks. This reminded people that these diseases are very dangerous. There are still people who firmly believe that their child’s autism was caused by vaccination and nothing will weaken them in this belief. However, our social nature strongly inclines us to do what others do, and to value what others value.

Image credit New Media Science Communication

Sciencesexism: A question from Wendy Barnaby

Are women and men making different contributions to science? I was asked this question by broadcaster Wendy Barnaby in 2011. I still stand by my answer I gave her then. It would be a huge advance if we could overcome gender stereotypes in science and I believe we can overcome them through science. Science is a phenomenon that can shape attitudes and beliefs as strongly as religion and political ideologies. Science is famed for getting rid of superstitions and for having pointed out the fallacy of many fondly held beliefs. It can also make us aware of the fallacy of gender stereotypes.

Carl Larsson Continue reading Sciencesexism: A question from Wendy Barnaby

But isn’t there at least a grain of truth in gender stereotypes? Our cognitive ability to categorise and polarise is strong and happens without us being aware of it. It has advantages in making instant judgements of social affiliation. Sometimes these are a matter of life or death: Family or fiend? Friend or foe? There is a cognitive advantage in this tendency in aligning yourself to an in-group and differentiating yourself from an out-group. The advantage is to allow you to act quickly when you are under time pressure, and have no time to acquire information about individuals.

There is also a major disadvantage. We are primed unwittingly to activate stereotypes when there is no time pressure at all. For example, the question “Are women and men making different contributions to science?” exerts a strong pressure to say ‘yes’. What instantly springs to my mind is the widely held belief that women have more empathy, are more communicative, are more cooperative and less aggressive than men. After all I want to be loyal to my in-group. So it is compelling to conclude that women do science in an altogether nicer and friendlier way than men. But, hang on – I can afford the time to reflect. I can ask is this true of me, for example? And the answer immediately turns into a ‘no’. I know about myself that I am far less empathic and far more aggressive than I let on. Also, I am constantly meeting men who have masses of empathy, who are keen to cooperate and who hate to be aggressive and confrontational. As scientists I have always found women and men to be equally curious, committed and determined to answer the questions they have set themselves. The scientists I know all love to gossip about other scientists, gloat when their competitors fail, rejoice when their friends succeed while trying to have nothing but friends.

Stereotypes are very powerful. They can make us conform to them when we don’t even notice. But we can see through them as soon as we take the time to reflect. Science instils in us the need to be sceptical of current beliefs. Good scientific practice is to uncover and work against existing biasses.

Image credit: Carl Larsson: Holiday Reading. Sotheby’s Auction catalogue Scandinavian Paintings. London 10 Dec 2014.

A strange find

At the beginning of December, the night before I was flying to Zürich, I tried to find some Swiss Francs in the drawer where such things are usually kept. No Francs were lurking there, but instead at the bottom of the drawer there were two tightly folded pages of lined paper. I did not think that I had ever seen them before. But, they were covered with my own handwriting, in pencil.  I was curious and apprehensive of what these pages would reveal. It turned out to be the beginning of a story that I had started to write 40 years ago.StoryDrawstoryP1

A very long time ago, in the early 1970s, I wrote a few short stories that were inspired by a Science Fiction class that Chris and I attended. I was incredibly proud when Philip Strick, our course teacher, included one of my stories in a collection called Antigrav (Arrow Books). I still list it as publication  No. 19 (1975) in my full bibliography. However, in 1975, my life changed: our son Martin was born in April that year, and our son Alex in 1978. For obvious reasons, there was no time for dilettante writing. Continue reading A strange find

Memories came back, memories of the days long before word processors and when we lived in Herne Hill. This was one of many story ideas, which started with a title, and not much more.  I never knew where the titles came from but I used to let them lead me with my pencil to somewhere I hadn’t thought of before. The title of this story “The weather at the bay” struck me as very strange, and I wondered whether it came from a dream. I was immediately determined that I would finish the story, and that I would not tinker with the text.  It already contained some few crossed out words and phrases. I think that writing stories was for me an antidote to writing journal articles. Here I could be unconcerned and playful. Would I have written more stories if my life had been different? A different life, a parallel universe…the ending quickly fell into place before I went to sleep that night.

The weather at the bay by Uta Frith (1974?/2014). The throng pushed into the old fashioned lift and this suddenly separated a small and mixed group of people from the milling multitude in the shopping arcade. The lift elevated them high up above the crowds. They entered a world of dark brown furniture, white tablecloths and tobacco smoke. Amelia and Harry entered the restaurant and were immediately delighted by the magnificent view of the sea through bay windows. The old head waiter in his tail coat just finished an announcement with the words: “-and the weather at the bay is fair.”

They sat down on velvet chairs with their little daughter. Henrietta wore a gown of white lace and blue ribbons and with her long brown hair looked as much like a Renoir painting as the parents had intended her to be. There was much humming and talking noise from people at other tables, eating elegant titbits, calls for hurrying waiters, clinking of china on china and silver on silver.

The sea was grey and much darker than the sky. Dashes of white foam could be seen all along the wave front. A noticeable wind added to the sensations of coolness and freshness. A very dry faintly pink sandy track ran down from the hotel to the sea. Clumps of dark pines on slender stems were visible, but the grey houses were difficult to focus and of uncertain style and form. People were down there too but seemed little more than quickly moving black and white spots.

A gong sounded and the headwaiter started to make another announcement. In the general noise, Harry & Amelia could not make out the words, except that the weather at the bay was fair. Let’s go to the sea, they decided [HERE THE STORY HAD STOPPED]

even though they had a vague impression from the announcement that a boating accident had occurred. Many people were now moving on the sandy track towards the beach. Others hurried over a bridge framed on both sides by lattice work. They could hardly be distinguished. Amelia exclaimed: “How like a dream it seems. So many people. Why are there are  there always so many people in dreams?” Henrietta asked: “Are these people not real then?” -“Of course they are”, answered Harry, “they are real while they are there”.

A loudspeaker announcement could now be heard. There was indeed a boating accident, and the small body of a child was lying on the beach, surrounded by helpers and bystanders. They drew nearer, swept along by everybody into a thickening mist. “Who is this child?” asked Amelia. “It’s Octavius Raynott”, was the reply, “we have no idea why he drowned; he was an excellent swimmer; he won some contests even; we are all devastated”. – “This cannot be true!” cried Amelia , “Octavius Raynott is my father! He died of lung cancer only 2 years ago.” Harry watched horror stricken as Amelia and Henrietta disappeared into the mist that had so rapidly formed. Before he could run after them, he had to close his eyes in a flash of pain. The weather had changed dramatically, and the sun shone directly into his eyes. He got up from the bench he was sitting on looking at a calm sea with a blue and turquoise sheen. He put on his sunglasses and left the book he had been reading lying on the bench, just as he had found it. The words on the page read “the weather at the bay is fair.” -“No, it isn’t”, he said, as he was walking towards the bright sun.

Neurosexism: A conversation with Cordelia Fine

Uta: Cordelia, you just published a review article in Science, His brain, her brain?  where you argue that it is far harder to interpret gender differences in the brain than people think. And it’s a call for more rigorous science in the field. Now, your paper with Gina Rippon, Rebecca Jordan-Young and Anelis Kaiser earlier this year lays out in some detail what rigorous research designs would actually involve. I would love to know a bit more about why you wrote it.

Mary Cassatt (1878) Woman reading Le Figaro: Courtesy of www,marycassatt.org

Cordelia: We wanted to write something positive about how research in this area could be done better, so we got together to write a paper that would be helpful to researchers, editors, reviewers and science communicators. We wanted to make a constructive contribution. After all, there has been a lot of controversy in this area,

Continue reading Neurosexism: A conversation with Cordelia Fine

Uta: You can say that again! The papers that report gender differences are almost always suggesting that women’s brains work differently, aka less well. So half the readers say, “At last there is some hard evidence for differences that are blindingly obvious”, and half say, “Of course we know that women and men are equal and there are no real brain differences, and this research must be hopelessly biased.” I expect you call the first position “essentialist”, because it presumes that being female means being one kind of thing, being male another, forever. It’s the forever bit that makes it suspect.

Cordelia: Happily, the perspectives are definitely not that polarized. One thing that’s worth stressing though is that criticisms of this area of research don’t stem from a belief that it’s intrinsically problematic to look at the effects of biological sex on the brain. But implicit assumptions about female/male differences in brain and behavior do influence research design and interpretation. They do this in ways that can give rise to misleading conclusions that additionally reinforce harmful gender stereotypes.

Uta: It would be strange to rule out this type of research on the grounds that it is bound to reinforce gender stereotypes. We can be aware of their influence and take them into account. But we need to be fearless when we read Nature’s book. It does not always tell us what we’d like to hear. I worry about our tendency to be ultra-critical when the findings are against our fondly held beliefs. But isn’t science exactly about being able to overturn fondly held beliefs?

Cordelia: I certainly agree that we shouldn’t rule out particular kinds of research because we may not like the conclusions. The concern is with conclusions that are unwarranted – an issue of ‘scientific correctness’ rather than ‘political correctness’ – and the goal is not to be ultra-critical, but to make visible the implicit assumptions that are guiding research.

Uta: We tend to be less critical when a paper appears in a prestigious journal because we can assume that there has been a stringent peer review process. You discuss the controversial Ingalhalikar et al.’s structural connectome article published in 2013 in PNAS – a reputable journal.

Cordelia: This article measured brain connectivity in a large sample of 8-22 year olds, and found greater intra-hemispheric connectivity in males and inter-hemispheric connectivity in females, on average.

Uta: This sounds like a good sort of gender difference, at first glance it has nothing to do with a gender bias, but it certainly is grist to the essentialist mill. I remember when I first read this paper I was thinking, so there is now some evidence for an essentialist type sex difference, and we can start to think what it means.

Cordelia: In our article, we make the case that researchers are often working from an implicit ‘gender essentialist’ model, that assumes that the brains and psyches of females and males are highly distinct, and differences between them are natural, fixed and invariant across time and place. This subtly influences research design and interpretation, and the Ingalhalikar et al. study was a good example of exactly that.

Uta: So what’s wrong with that?

Cordelia: In an earlier study, the researchers had reported behavioural sex differences in executive control, memory, reasoning, spatial processing, sensorimotor skills and social cognition. This was in a larger sample from which these participants were drawn. But these differences were very modest: 11 of the 26 effect sizes were null/d<0.1, and the largest was d=0.33. Yet despite the substantial behavioural similarity between the sexes, the researchers interpreted their anatomical findings as underlying profound behavioural differences between the sexes, without actually testing for brain-behaviour correlations.

Uta: And what did you think of their interpretation of the brain differences?

Cordelia: They speculated that “[m]ale brains are structured to facilitate connectivity between perception and coordinated action, whereas female brains are designed to facilitate communication between analytical and intuitive processing modes.”

Uta: Perhaps they couldn’t think of what else the differences could be due to.

Cordelia: There were two other possibilities they might have considered, but didn’t, presumably because of the essentialist frame. One is that the female/male interconnectivity differences are a brain size effect, rather than a sex effect. As you know, the male brain is on average about ten per cent larger than the female brain. They also didn’t pay any empirical or theoretical attention to the possible influence of gendered experiences on brain and behaviour. I happened to be sent the article by a journalist for comment, and I wrote back to her:

“Ironically, even though the research from this group provides strong evidence for behavioral similarities between the sexes, provides no evidence that any modest behavioral sex differences are associated with neurological ones, and offers no information about the developmental origins of either, we can probably anticipate that this article will soon be drawn on by popular commentators as evidence that ‘hardwired’ sex differences explain why men are from Mars and women are from Venus.”

Uta: This is precisely what happened.

Cordelia: Yes. The front page of the Independent, for instance, headlined with “Scientists discover the difference between male and female brains: Study reveals variation in hardwiring which may explain skills gap between women and men”.

It’s worth pointing out though that this particular example was unusual for the role of the researchers themselves in making reference to ‘hardwiring’, and in making especially incautious reverse inferences to concepts far beyond any measured behaviours (like motherly intuition). Usually this is a job left to the popularizers.

Uta: Hardwiring usually means that there is a biological cause for a behaviour. But, as you say, it could be the other way round. The hardwiring could be a result of behavioural practice. There are plenty of examples of how learning changes the brain.

Cordelia: Yes, and long before the buzz about neuroplasticity, feminist neurobiologists were writing about this ‘entanglement’: the fact that the social phenomenon of gender (which systematically affects an individual’s psychological, physical, social and material experiences) is literally incorporated, shaping the brain and endocrine system. One of the recommendations of our article is for researchers to attempt to incorporate the principle of entanglement into their research models, including more and/or different categories of independent variables that include ways of capturing the role of the environment.

Uta: We clearly need more thoughtful research in this area: You and your co-authors have made a very constructive start with your paper.

Cordelia Fine is the author of Delusions of gender.  She is ARC Future Fellow at Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences and Associate Professor at the Melbourne Business School and the Centre for Ethical Leadership, University of Melbourne.

 

The last ferry from Esbjerg to Harwich: Why do we behave irrationally – or do we?

DSCF0114The Dana Sirena, the huge ferry, which has crossed the North Sea every day for uncountable years, will run no more. There is only one more journey and that will be to return from Harwich to Esbjerg – and that ‘s it. We don’t know who made the decision and we wonder what the arguments might have been. We are a bit sad and wonder whether this is a sign that our annual trips to Aarhus for the last ten years must come to an end sometime.

Waiting in the car to get on the ferry, we looked back at a lecture by Antonio Rangel, a few days before, which we much enjoyed. Rangel is a leading practitioner of neuro-economics, from Caltech, and he talked about some serious methodological issues in this field. It’s not about lack of replication, but about remoteness from real life. We have to face it, what people do in the lab just doesn’t transfer to the real world. Something crucial is being left out and not understood. People aren’t behaving as if they were optimal Bayesians. Continue reading The last ferry from Esbjerg to Harwich: Why do we behave irrationally – or do we?

UF: To be optimal our behaviour should be rational – no?

CDF: What economists and others mean by rational behaviour is that you choose the option that gives the highest benefit.

UF: This sounds okay, but people often seem not to choose what’s best for them.

CDF: Ah, this depends. Think of the famous Marshmallow experiment. You have to resist taking the one Marshmallow so that after a certain time you will receive two. But, is it always better to delay? Of course not. If the situation is unpredictable, then it is better to take the one Marshmallow than risk never getting any.

UF: So being impulsive is not always a bad idea.

CDF: You don’t choose a big reward option, if it is very unlikely to be achieved. To answer your question, people and other animals for that matter, don’t necessarily behave irrationally if they don’t do what is predicted by a formula to get them the highest value. The formula works in the lab where stakes are low and choices to be made occur with equal likelihood. Rangel argued that these situations are quite irrelevant to real life situations. What looks like weird behaviour from the theoretician’s point of view, turns out to be quite sensible when looked at in the right context. Maybe supposedly irrational people are maximising different variables compared to what the theoreticians think they ought to be maximising.

UF: So ‘crazy’ people aren’t irrational either?

CDF: Well, a very common idea is that everyone would behave like them if they had their bizarre experiences. Irrational behaviour means the model doesn’t fit.

UF: I see. The bizarre experiences are the proper context to explain the behaviour, which might be optimal. I like it, because once again we see how important it is to consider context. Do you have an example?

CDF: It always matters how something is framed. If someone says, “my glass is half-empty” this most likely means “please fill it up”. If someone says, “my glass is half-full” this means, “I’ve got enough for the moment”. So glass half-full and half-empty are not one and the same ‘value’. We find it incredibly easy to understand the meaning of utterances when we interact with others. We can calculate the value in a particular context quite fast.

UF: Isn’t it odd that when the questions are framed in a complex real life context, they become easy? It’s like a magic trick that shows us what the mind is really good at. It’s at home with complex computations that take into account what another person might know or not know. Strip the problems down to their logical essentials, and the computations become hard and result in errors.

CDF: The question is how does the mind do it? Models proposed by behavioural scientists and economists are extremely good at modelling very basic decision processes, but in social interactions other models are needed. Only if you have such models – and this will be after lots of behavioural experiments, – should you even begin to think of brain scanning. As Rangel said in his talk, brain scanning very rarely gives you any answers. You need a model first. It will not emerge from the data. If the data fit the model, then that means something.

UF: There is something else that I wish I understood better: What our ‘priors’ tell us, and what we pick up from current information are often at odds with each other. How do we deal with this?

CDF: There is a good example of how these two computations can be experimentally made to conflict, and in this case the priors win: In a trust game you learn over many rounds how people behave and this should give you a good idea of whether or not to trust that person. But you pay less attention to this learning process when the experimenter has planted in you some prior knowledge about the other person. For example, you read that Peter, the partner in your game, has recently been given a medal for rescuing a child from a fire, and has raised large amounts of money for charity. During the game, however, Peter behaves abominably and cheats. Yet, you remain trusting when all your unconscious processes want to tell you that you should distrust. Bad mistake.

UF: I can see how this relates to irrational behaviour: It is the personal and the subpersonal fighting it out with each other. But it is not always clear which type of knowledge you should use for the best: the prior knowledge that you have about the other person and their past deeds, or the information you currently extract from your interaction with them.

CDF: The prior knowledge you get from others will always come from a much larger database than your own direct experience. Perhaps that’s why we pay more attention to knowledge from others?

UF: Sometimes the priors can be too strong, and sometimes the bottom-up learning can exert too much influence. If there is a conflict that can’t be resolved, the decision is likely to be considered irrational.

CDF: Of course the priors are not fixed. They are constantly being altered by what happens in our real time interaction with the world and other people. Data from psychophysics tasks tell us that the decision you just made affects your next decision. How can I know what I like until I see what I have chosen? My behaviour tells me something – now I know what I should do next time.

UF: Is this similar to what happens when we follow the crowd and do what other people do? They may know something that we don’t know. We can benefit from their knowledge, as long as they have it. Like the traders on the stock exchange, who buy stocks that others buy. Perhaps they believe that the others have inside knowledge. This might sometimes even be true, but if it isn’t, stock market bubbles can be created. This certainly looks like irrational behaviour.

CDF: I think we have been talking about our favourite topic: Two systems and how they influence each other, System 1 and System 2, in Kahneman’s sense. Sub-personal and personal in Dennett’s sense. The influence of other people on us, and our influence on them occur both at the personal and the subpersonal level.

UF: But how does the influence of other people, say on the stockmarket, come about?

CDF: That’s what our book has to be about.

Meanwhile, after a long wait, we can drive onto the ferry. We spot a TV cameraman and a presenter in a long black coat, watching and commenting on the last journey of the old Dana Sirena from Denmark to England.

Our colleague from the Interacting Minds Centre at Aarhus University, Andreas Højlund Nielsen, told us about a 15 minute documentary film made by his sister-in-law, Mie Lorenzen. It is called ‘18 hours aboard the England ferry’. It will provide you with the tranquillity of a very calm transit.

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How to influence people and get approval from your Granny by Uri Hertz

 

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Continue reading How to influence people and get approval from your Granny by Uri Hertz

The cartoon by Uri Hertz was sparked by a paper by Bayarri and DeGroot (1989) entitled “Optimal Reporting of Predictions”. Uri is part of Bahador Barami’s group on Crowd Cognition at UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience. The last time I visited the ICN I asked Bahador if he or his colleagues might like to contribute to Socialminds. To my delight, he agreed, and he suggested that Uri draw a cartoon relating to a topic we were just discussing:  The importance of metacognition for social communication. How certain are you about what you want to communicate? What risk is there to your reputation if you get it wrong? There was a paper about this, Bahador said and the point the paper makes is that the advice depends on your current influence on the person you advise.

What does this mean? The cartoon makes it very clear. You and a number of other advisors report your belief in some variable (say the probability of a phone being a good buy, a stock going up). The advisee knows each of the advisors and she does not trust them all equally. This can be rephrased as follows: she has assigned a prior weight that represents the amount of influence each advisor has on her. These weights are updated when information about the variable comes to light (the phone is shown to break down easily; the stock did actually go up). The updating process takes into account not only whether the advisor was correct, but also how vigorously he reported his belief. If you stated high belief in some previously ignored stock going up, and it actually does go up, your influence will show an increase. It will get the highest increase if the other advisors expressed only weak belief about the stock going up (e.g. they overlooked or discarded the possibility). However, if you are wrong, and if you stated your belief very strongly, as opposed to the other advisors, then your influence will suffer a dramatic fall.

Bayarri and DeGroot show in their paper that in order to increase their influence (posterior weight) over time, advisors should adapt their belief reporting strategy, rather than faithfully stating their beliefs. If you happen to be an advisor, your optimal strategy depends on your current influence (or weight). When your influence is low, you should exaggerate your beliefs (vigorously give a definite yes or a definite no).

This is what the left side of the figure illustrates. It shows how you can take advantage of situations in which other advisers report low belief, and the outcome agrees with your belief. Optimal strategiesHowever, if you are a person who has high influence to begin with, the optimal strategy is to be conservative, understating your belief, as shown on the right side of the figure. This strategy keeps your influence rating from collapsing when your advice turns out to be wrong.

The cartoon highlights the real life implications. Optimal strategies really depend on your current influence! Any mistake that Max makes will cost him dear. But Moritz does not have to worry about such cost. His influence can hardly go down any further.

Is this a rare case? Far from it. The process of giving advice, and any transmission of privately held information, is the basis of communication and cooperation. It includes a first step of establishing the private beliefs, either from perception or experience, and a second step of communicating these beliefs. In the first stage you have identified a stimulus and assessed the probability of a reward – but it also involves metacognitive abilities. Bayarri and DeGroot’s study shows that your beliefs are transformed according to the social context even before they are communicated. So giving advice is not just a case of identifying a stimulus, and communicating it to another person. You have to assess not only how confident you are in your judgement but have to factor in the other person’s likely opinion about you. This is how deeply our social nature affects our judgment as well as our presentation. It makes sense: if we are highly trusted already we can easily fall from grace with injudiciously worded advice. Likewise, if we were previously ignored, we can suddenly gain status if we hit the bull’s eye. If we were wrong, no matter, – you can’t sink even further. As the hedge fund managers say “always remember the value of your investments can go down as well as up”.

So yes, metacognition is critical for social communication.

A Danish Breakfast with Andreas Roepstorff

 

Breakfast with Andreas

We are very fond of the light, bright, functional Scandinavian style of our apartment in Nobelparken, Aarhus University. It has been our home during our many stays, short and long, over the last ten years. The reason that we are coming here to the Interacting Minds Centre, and keep coming back, is Andreas Roepstorff. One of our special treats is if he comes to breakfast and brings with him freshly baked bread. Today he has also brought a chokoladestang, a classic Danish pastry, extra special. Actually, Danish pastry is called ‘wienerbrød’. All the ingredients of a ‘hyggelig’ breakfast are here. Also candles, thin chocolate slices, honey, jam, cheese, rullepølser, and plenty of coffee. Perhaps there are some other essential Scandinavian style ingredients, an open plan flat and some open plan minds.  Continue reading A Danish Breakfast with Andreas Roepstorff

In this context anything can be discussed. There is no need to be afraid of the big and awkward questions. We started talking about overall goals, long held beliefs, what we would really like to accomplish. Andreas suggested straight away that we need to think of hierarchies of goals, referring to Etienne Koechlin. Koechlin has mapped out hierarchies of goals in the Prefrontal Cortex. Long held beliefs will be kept in the background and other more short term beliefs will be nested within.

It’s all about upholding alternative views of the future, Andreas says. Then Chris throws in “Mental time travel”. I say “Episodic foresight” – as in a pleasant game of ping-pong.

AR: There is the open future – there are several possibilities in front of you.

UF: Ah – so like you to say this. The Viking spirit and your trademark – the Blue Ocean.

CDF: This is where other people give these alternative views.

UF: Where culture = other people.

AR: Okay. Think of the Blue Ocean – we can navigate in the future. We explore.

CDF: Not only finding out what world is like, but creating a world as we’d like it to be.

AR: Creating the world in your image. God-like.

UF: ??

AR: Religion is an extension of the social image. It’s a hierarchical story. You create the top of the hierarchy.

UF: Go on.

AR: The world is unpredictable. But we believe there is a real world – this constrains us.

UF: ??

AR: The other problem is: other people have different perspectives. We have the Ukraine example.

UF: If everyone had the same idea, what then?

AR: Maybe it’d be like China in the old days.

— We pause to help ourselves to more bread, butter and stuff to put on top.

 

AR: Here is a long held belief: the openness of the human cognitive system.  But there are constraints. Low level behaviour is constrained totally by immediate environment.

CDF: The higher up in hierarchy, the less constrained.

AR: The ability to share possible futures, to co-create, undoes the straight jacket that is there otherwise.

CDF: Humans are good at creating new niches.

AR: Yeah, and at changing the world to fit them. Imagining the future.

Aarhus sybilsUF: I have always been struck by the deep human interest in forecasts. You can see it in ancient archaeological sites, like Stonehenge, or the oracle of Delphi. There are the lovely medieval pictures of the Sybils in Aarhus cathedral. People have been obsessed by predicting the future. They have lots of devices for doing so. Why?

AR: You need external help, devices to forecast. Astronomy is way beyond human time scale. How long do you need to know that something is cyclical?

CDF: The Babylonians knew about the 18 years moon cycle.  They had to have instruments to monitor their observations over such a time scale. And once you start monitoring…there comes control.

UF: Are there some practical suggestions here? I would like to predict our own future.

AR: I have devised this exercise for postdocs: This is what I ask them when they first come:  Imagine yourself in five years time. Everything has gone as well as possible. It is 2019. You are invited to give keynote speech at a big conference. In Hawaii, no less. How did you get there? What would you want to tell people? Who is in the audience? Whom would you like to impress, living or dead?

UF: Nice.

AR: Some students know on the spot. They can then write a grant application.

UF: There is the curse of the here and now. An eternally extending tree of possibilities. The more you think about it the more choices you have.

AR: Exactly. You cannot see the path from here that will lead to a future endpoint. There are just too many branches. But you can, if it’s the other way round: Start from the endpoint and go back to the present.

postdicting the future

CDF: This is analogous to Daniel Wolpert’s solution to the motor problem by minimising endpoint variability.

UF: We have a theory now.

CDF: When you make an action there are an infinite number of ways to proceed. You first choose the endpoint and then you can minimise end-point error.

AR: Cultural experience allows a blueprint for the future. People do have expectations of their future. Ideal scenarios have an internal logic. You get all this from your culture and can frontload it in a ‘cognitive app’.

UF: So the blue ocean has some pre-defined spots to aim for?

AR: The critical thing is to place a buoy out there. Then you have to do something to get there.

CDF: Your exercise for postdocs is all very well. But what it doesn’t allow for is taking advantage of unforeseen opportunities that happen to occur. You should take this up and then you could go into a completely different direction.

AR: Reconfiguring is always fine. It is easier to follow a tangential line when you have a larger perspective. If your goals are too short term then this doesn’t work, and you can go off course.

UF: The proper Long Term perspective is from death.

AR: From beyond death. You have to see yourself from other people’s point of view in the far future. Think of your legacy.

CDF: What my mother used to call “the backdrop of eternity”.

— More helpings of coffee and chocoladestang are now necessary. Chris offers to make more coffee.

 

AR: Going back to the Blue Ocean and the exercise for postdocs. It’s necessary to anchor the imagination in a specific place. Hawaii. And there need to be specific people who the post-doc would like to be in the audience, and he would like to impress.

UF: I like this idea that specific constraints like these concrete anchor points actually get the imagination going.

AR: If you don’t have these far flung anchor points, then you can get into cognitive apathy; the more you think about it, the more choices open up, and it becomes even more complicated. I have been there….

CDF: In the Tower of London game where you have to plan future moves, there is this interesting observation: if there are two equally good moves, then you slow down. You would have thought you could speed up, since it doesn’t matter which one you choose! Now here’s an experiment: Would performance be improved if you asked people to think about planning their moves backwards rather than forwards?

UF: Good – we always need to finish on a suggestion for a new experiment!

image credit: groenling at flickr (1989): Sybils in Aarhus cathedral

Putting language into the social brain

cartoon@langBlogChris and I are visitors at the Interacting Minds Centre at Aarhus University during August and September 2014.  This is a great opportunity to meet people who excel at providing stimulating conversation on “What makes us social”.  Admittedly I am more of a talker than a listener, and I assume that talking is completely, utterly, super-important in interactions. So why do social neuroscientists not pay more attention to language? Continue reading Putting language into the social brain

Kristian Tylen is the person I turned to with my burning question: What is the role of language? When we consider social interactions this almost always involves language. Is language actually the primary driver of our social interactions, or is it the other way round?

KT:  Language is multimodal. It probably started with gestures and this presupposed social interaction of a kind. There are different theories about the evolution of language and there is actually no real consensus.

UF: That’s what I felt when I recently read Stephen Levinson’s review  of two new books on the evolution of language, one by Derek Bickerton and one by Michael Tomasello.

KT: These represent interestingly different theories and there are others too. There is the view that language should be seen as completely separate from social communication, and that it grows from its own cognitive mechanisms. I sort of doubt this. I think language is primarily for the use of communication and it evolved as a tool to improve communication.

UF: Without specifically referring to Chomsky, what do you think about an innate predisposition for language in humans?

KT: It depends on what you mean by innate. My preference is to think that language both evolves from and is shaped by our interactions with the surrounding physical and social environment.  And so it is out there rather than inside us. This is demonstrated by the way that language structures are motivated. Take the way we talk about pitch  In English and Danish: We talk about low and high pitch mapping onto low and high spatial notation. Other languages for instance use thick and thin or big and small. These relations all map onto universal experience. Low tones come from big creatures and high tones from small creatures. And it turns out that it is very difficult to learn the opposite relations.

UF: But things out there need to act on the brain, no?  I don’t disagree with you that the world outside the mind is a starting point, but the experience of the outside shaped the inside, over millenia.  As a consequence, I guess there are some pre-shaped circuits in the brain, which might become obsolete, if  the environment changed radically.  So this is why I would put the outside in second place, and the inside first.

KT: So what do you mean by innate?

UF: I use the word for neural circuits that have a long evolutionary history. I don’t use innate to mean present at birth, and I don’t use it to mean that learning is not required. But I believe the circuits are preprogrammed for certain types of learning to be facilitated. That is why I like to talk of start-up kits rather than innate circuits. Start-up kits lead to effortless fast learning. No start-up kits require effortful slow learning.

KT: For me, it’s important to remember that the driver of evolutionary history is the environment, and this rather puts anything innate in second place. I am not very comfortable with putting too much stress on the inside of humans. Communication happens because we share the same experiences and systems on the outside and can create symbols that are mutually understood almost irrespective of our individual insides.

UF: Here is my naïve sketch of a likely scenario for the evolution of language in human beings, as opposed to other species. I want to speculate on what might be an innate start-up kit, still requiring learning, and what might not be innate and can only be gained by learning.

Chris, who meanwhile did the sensible thing of googling ‘evolution of language’, weighed in with a devastating remark:  You might be interested to know that the Linguistic Society of Paris in 1866 banned any debate on the topic as unsuitable for study because of the lack of empirical evidence.

UF: Too bad. I will still tell my story. I have only just made it up!  And what you are saying means that It cannot be worse than any other current proposals. They’re all speculation.

In the beginning was not the word. In the beginning there were two things: a start-up kit for spontaneous vocalisations, and another for spontaneous mentalising. These innate mechanisms are visible in precisely located and well connected neural circuits in the brain. They evolved separately, growing from already existing capacities in our remote ancestors.

KT: What were these pre-existing capacities?

UF: I speculate that even very remote ancestors had vocalisations, and they had the experience of agency. They must have had this to distinguish prey and predator and behave accordingly.

My story requires a third thing, and it demands a sufficiently complex brain. This is combining language and mentalising. This is not trivial. I imagine it needed many generations of our ancestors inventing words and telling each other what they mean, influencing each others minds along the way. Now for the magic bit: Language and mentalising put together enhanced each of their effects. This third thing is perhaps primarily responsible for the rise of human culture.

CDF: Mike Tomasello made a similar but different proposal. He believes that the ability to cooperate is a uniquely human driver of language and of culture.

UF: But what underlies the ability to cooperate in the way humans do? I would guess it depends on mentalising. I find it hard to conceptualise cooperation, or joint attention for that matter, as a more primary mechanism than mentalising. Cooperation and joint attention are not so much cognitive mechanisms as behaviours. No doubt cooperation is an important driver of culture, but so is probably competition. We cooperate within groups but compete with other groups.

KT: Why not? It’s a ‘just so story’ as always happens when people talk about evolution.

CDF: I think the Linguistic Society of Paris had the right idea.

Our conversation ended, but here are some details  that I would have given to bolster up my argument – if I had had the chance.

1. Spontaneous vocalisation. These have a useful instrumental purpose, like the warning cries that initiate flight from predators, or the high pitched cries that bind mothers and babies. This is a mechanism present in many mammal brains and presumably present in human ancestors as well. However, as Stephen Levinson reminds us in his review, the vocal apparatus of human beings is immensely complex and is under voluntary control, which may not be the case in many other animals. Speech is a complex motor action and well localized in the brain. Voice actions and hand gestures have similar requirements in terms of motor programmes and syntax. The FOXP2 gene has been associated with such actions and their relevance to speech and motor disorders has been documented.

2. Spontaneous mentalising. I find it very interesting that Martin & Santos have shown that the monkey brain can represent another’s viewpoint, but not another’s belief. Only the latter counts as mentalising, and Agnes Kovacs and her colleagues observed this in 7 months old babies. There are many other advantages, such as friendship, and also some disadvantages, such as deception. Apparently, there are forms of friendship and deception present in monkeys, but typically as rare examples. It is easy to see how language can scale up both advantages and disadvantages.

3. The third thing – two together. I am speculating that one of the two mechanisms on its own would probably bring you up to the level of a three-year old child. Not bad, but not enough to get on with the business of creating lasting and cumulative culture. Culture, as we all know depends on learning from others.  The specifically human form of learning from others which involves teaching is likely to be dependent on mentalising, but it would be a poor vehicle for learning without language.  Humans use language not just to make others do something, but also to express their mental states and to appeal to another’s mental state. Humans have done very well by learning from each other through the use of language. After many thousands of years humans got to a point where language was turned into literacy, and then science and technology started to take off.

Of course there are alternative views

How to be smart

Are humans the smartest species? What does it mean to be smart?

CDF: I am very interested in your suggestion that we should think about specific packages of behaviour for different species that are determined, to some degree, by their environmental niche. This brings me to a question I have often thought about. We often assume that humans differ from other species simply because we are smarter. But what do we mean by smart? Perhaps I can anticipate your answer: What is smart in one niche might be foolish in another. For example, we assume that being able to delay gratification (not eating the marshmallow immediately) is smart, but it would be very foolish in a volatile environment where no one can be trusted.

Continue reading How to be smart

RR: Being smart must include surviving and producing surviving offspring – just think about the opposite.

CDF: In this sense, in the long run, bacteria will turn out to be far smarter than humans.

RR: There is more to being smart: we usually mean something specifically cognitive. Evolution involves adaptation but in a stable environment this can lead to specialization that becomes maladaptive when the environment changes. Being large may be advantageous because it means you may be able to overwhelm your enemies. But the package of being large means you take a long time to grow, produce a few offspring that need looking after and therefore you need to live a long time. This makes your species vulnerable to environmental fluctuations. Bacteria are smart because they reproduce very quickly and can adapt rapidly to environmental change. So, in the battle between antibiotic-wielding humans and bacteria, the bacteria tend to win. The mega-fauna did well in a stable environment, but do not cope well with human-induced environmental change and many will soon be extinct.

UF: I am glad that we are not giants.

RR: Humans are not giants, but they are mega-fauna. They are exceptionally successful as mega-fauna because their best adaptation is adaptability itself. Humans have adapted, behaviourally, to many different terrains and climates and have changed the terrain to suit themselves. They have also changed the climate, but haven’t quite adapted to that yet.

SmartTestSo it is cognitive and behavioural flexibility that makes humans smart. Cognitive flexibility allows humans to learn a lot which makes them even more behaviourally flexible and therefore even smarter.

 

UF: How on earth did humans evolve to have this adaptability? Can you briefly sketch out how this might have happened?

RR: We need to talk about selection and the Baldwin Effect.

This describes the way that learned products of cognitive flexibility  – good survival tricks – become genetically determined in a species by selection, rather than by inheritance of acquired characteristics. Here is an example: When proto-humans increased their communication skills as proto-speech, individuals with useful cognitive apps in this new social environment e.g. being good at remembering the order of sounds, being good at hearing inflections, would be favoured. This goes on over many generations and eventually a large collection of language-useful apps would be embedded in the human brain.

Now as to the mechanisms involved – this is complicated. We have to consider what genes do. Genes always compete against their alternative alleles and never do anything for the good of the species. But genes have the products of other genes, in their own body and other bodies, as part of their environment, such that complex competitions and co-operations will develop between genes. Picture how different personality types may win or lose depending on the environment. Sometimes pessimists survive catastrophe, and sometimes optimists advantageously exploit opportunities.  So a mixture of different cognitive styles (think collections of cognitive apps) will exist in a population in an equilibrium, which will fluctuate with environmental events.

Being a lot smarter than other people has survival value but it has one obvious disadvantage; in a social species being different can be difficult.

PunchLeaps&Bounds2ndMrsTanV104P273.5.5-100

Acknowledgements: ‘Culture-fair test’ modified Danish cartoon, source unknown; ‘Leaps & Bounds’, Punch Magazine vol 4 p 273 June 10th 1893

Are bees better than humans?

To distract me from dangerous goings-on outside my window, where men are cutting down tall trees, Chris & Uta have asked me about the social lives of marmosets. This is not really altruism on their part. They will use the information for their book.

CDF: We want to know about the origins of human social cognition. Where should we look? Bees and ants? Other primates?

Continue reading Are bees better than humans?

RR: I think you need to look at all and any species and work out the packages of behaviour that different species use.

UF: What do you mean by packages of behaviour?

RR: Behaviour, and social structure, depend on the constraints of environment and evolution and both boil down to reproductive success. Does the species have to get through a cold winter? Does the species live up trees? It is factors like these that will determine whether the species produces a large number of offspring with low parental investment or a low number of offspring with high parental investment. These strategies come as packages and much social structure follows therefrom.

UF: So, is reproductive behaviour, mating and nurturing the young, at the biological root of social behaviour?

RR: This is where we find differences between species, because of the constraints I just mentioned. Old World monkeys tend to have a hierarchical mating system. Here males compete with other males for access to large numbers of females – though it all gets complicated with alliances and pay-offs. New World monkeys tend to live in more or less monogamous families – though it all gets complicated with adultery and incest. New World monkeys tend to live up trees, like birds, which are also usually monogamous so perhaps trees matter.

UF: Are humans more similar in their mating strategy to New World monkeys?

RR: Humans exhibit different strategies in different societies depending on food supply and other external threats. We can infer a lot about Human ancestral social behaviour by the fact that males are slightly bigger than females. This size difference occurs in any species where males compete with other males for resources and for females. The ultimate aim here is to win wars, get rid of other males, and acquire as many available females as possible. Of course, the size difference in humans is not large compared to the difference in some species. This implies a long history of more family based behavioural packages as well.

UF: Mike Tomasello’s lab has a vast number of studies comparing the joint interactions of great apes and those that happen between human children. There are similarities, but one of the main differences seems to be that, while human social interactions are basically cooperative, those of chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utan’s are mostly driven by competition. Tomasello’s conclusion is that great apes are extremely limited in their cooperative capacities, and this is their essential difference to humans.

CDF: But unlike chimpanzees, Marmosets seem to be extremely cooperative, showing, for example, cooperative breeding. Is this true?

marmosets RR: Kin selection explains many aspects of superficially altruistic behaviour. Co-operative breeding in marmosets usually means assisting in the rearing of the offspring of relatives because of the family structure of groups of marmosets. But an owner of a captive breeding colony of marmosets will often attempt to cross foster a neonate when the breeding female of one family has had just one baby and the breeding female of another family has just had triplets. This is often successful because the family can’t be sure that the newcomer is not related to them (and marmosets aren’t very good at counting either). In the wild, quite a large troop will contain mainly related animals. So a certain amount of general co-operation could be sustained by kin selection.

Several additional explanations have been put forward to explain co-operative behaviour in co-operative breeding species such as marmosets. These are all plausible, but none are truly altruistic since they increase the reproductive success or survival of the protagonist.

* Helpers that have cared for other infants have greater reproductive success when they become parents than individuals that do not have previous infant care experience. This is undoubtedly the case for marmosets.

* Unrelated helpers can gain the benefits of living in a social group, such as communal foraging or protection against predators. This requires the unrelated individual to be accepted by the group and this usually only occurs when the incomer arrives as a potential breeding partner.

* Males that display involvement with infants are more likely to obtain subsequent mating with the female they assist. This is unlikely since the male is usually assisting in the rearing of his own offspring (so has access to the dominant female) or his own sibs. The dominant female suppresses ovulation in her daughters and thereby prevents incest in the rest of the family.  “No hanky-panky please.”

UF: Social learning is something that happens in almost all animal species. It seems possible to us that this learning has shown a sort of step change in evolution in humans. This is to do with learning by deliberate teaching, a two-way process. Is this plausible? How would evolution explain such a step change?

RR: The difficulty in getting a hand-reared orphan animal to be accepted by, mate with and rear offspring with, members of their own species shows how important social learning is for survival. Evolution will favour parents who behave in such a way that offspring learn social behaviours. In New World monkey species, the fathers and older siblings contribute to the rearing of the next litter and, in captivity, offspring reared alone by just their mother are rarely able to rear offspring themselves. The difference between ‘behaving in such a way that learning in offspring occurs’ and ‘teaching offspring’ is one of intention by the parent and so the step change (if there is one) will lie in the evolution of several cognitive ‘apps’, e.g. ‘appreciation of the existence of the future’, such that intentions can develop. New ‘apps’ have emergent functions made from the amalgamation of smaller ‘apps’.

UF: I love your use of the term ‘app’ for a special cognitive adaptation!

CDF: The importance of learning by teaching is that it offers a mechanism for culture to accumulate over generations. Culture seems to be the one specialised niche for humans.

RR:  Intentionality will always speed up cultural development, but animals have cultures too. Diet and food-finding practices are cultural in that they differ between groups of the same species.

The trees are down now! Good. I can go out again.

CDF & UF: Thank you, Ros. We’ll be back and quiz you more about processes in the evolution of behaviour.

Photo acknowledgement: 

http://evoluahomosapiens.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/sagui-de-tufos-brancos-callithrix.html